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Introduction 
 
Medical devices (MDs) often obtain market authorization with much less clinical 
evidence than other health technologies, especially pharmaceuticals. This is due 
to a number of reasons. First, in contrast to pharmaceuticals, there is no legal 
requirement to conduct adequately controlled clinical studies, other than for Ǯ-ǯjurisdictions.  In the US for example, high-risk devices 
and innovative lower-risk devices are requǮ
assurance of ǯǡ clinical evidence based 
on randomized studies in many instances. In contrast, in the EU the requirement 
is to demonstrate adequate performance and safety, which can often be achieved 
by conducting observational studies such as registries (Kramer et al, 2012; 
Tarricone et al, 2014) (1,2).  
 
Secondly, the devices industry comprises many small and medium-size 
enterprises (SMEs), which would find the cost of conducting clinical studies, 
especially randomized controlled trials, prohibitive. However, although some 
larger manufacturers do undertake clinical studies of some of their products, 
manuȋǮ-ǯȌ can often claim Ǯǯhas market authorisation, thus 
avoiding the need to conduct costly and time-consuming clinical studies. Since 
regulatory agencies often accept these claims of equivalence, for example under 
the 510(k) process in the US (Fronsdal et al, 2012) (3), this further reduces the 
incentives for manufacturers to conduct expensive clinical studies. Therefore, 
although device manufacturers have patent protection, they are often not 
granted data exclusivity in the same way as pharmaceutical manufacturers. 
 
Finally, unlike pharmaceuticals, devices are often modified once on the market, 
meaning that even if clinical evidence was available for the original version of 
the product, it may not necessarily be available for the version currently being 
marketed. For example in the US, one analysis showed that for 77 original 
market authorization applications for cardiac implantable electronic devices (eg 
pacemakers, implantable cardioverter-defibrillators) since 1979, the FDA  ? ? ? ?Ǯǯmodifications in the period up 
until 2012. Of course, many of these product modifications were minor and 
unlikely to affect the performance of the device, but 37% involved a change to ǯ. In the vast majority of these cases the FDA deemed that new 
clinical data were not necessary for approval (Rome et al, 2014) (4). 
 
The lack of clinical evidence prior to product launch, especially evidence of 
comparative effectiveness, limits the possibilities for health technology 
assessment (Tarricone et al, 2014) (2). However, it should be remembered that 
clinical evidence can be gathered both pre-market (ie through conducting 
controlled clinical trials in an experimental setting), and post-market, through 
clinical studies undertaken in regular clinical practice. Post-market effectiveness 
research may be more important for MDs than pharmaceuticals, as the 
performance of the device often depends on the interaction with the user (the 
so-ǯȌ (Drummond et al, 2009) (5).  
 
This suggests that solutions to the problem of inadequate clinical evidence 
should address the issue of conducting clinical research in both the pre- and 
post-market phase. In this editorial we consider ways in which MD 
manufacturers could be incentivized to produce more clinical evidence to 
facilitate health technology assessments, including economic evaluations. 
 
Changing the requirements for clinical studies in pre-marketing phase 
 
One option would be to strengthen the requirements for conducting clinical 
studies in the pre-marketing phase. However, this can have disadvantages. 
Shuren and Califf (2016) (6)note that the greater evidentiary burden imposed by 
the Food and Drug Administration may create disincentives for manufacturers to 
bring important medical devices to the United States, or may delay access to 
devices. For example, they point out that the first transcatheter aortic valve 
replacement device was available for clinical use in Europe several years before 
it was available in the United States. However, they also point out that there are 
examples of unsafe and ineffective devices marketed in Europe that never made 
it to the US market (US Food and Drug Administration, 2016) (7).  
 
In most jurisdictions, the requirements for clinical studies in the pre-marketing 
stage depend on the level of risk associated with the device, although the precise 
requirements vary across jurisdictions. It is appropriate that the emphasis is on Ǯ ǯǡthe manufacturers of some 
devices clasǮǯȋȌǡ
prostheses, are not necessarily required to conduct clinical studies. Kesselheim 
and Rajan (2014) (8) point out that the FDA cleared a metal-on-metal hip under 
the 510(k) pathway that was later shown to posses a high risk of wear, corrosion 
and metal release into the bloodstream.  
 
Therefore, there may be a case for strengthening the requirements for clinical 
studies in the pre-marketing phase, based on safety considerations, which in 
turn would improve the evidence base for HTA. This could involve both 
requirements for RCTs or high quality observational studies, depending on the 
category of device. In some cases a traditional RCT, randomizing patients to 
treatment or control, may be difficult or impossible to conduct. However, it may 
be possible to delay treatment for some patients, or to take advantage of 
different rates of diffusion of particular devices in different geographical areas. 
The most critical issue is that of determining the evidentiary needs at each stage 
of the regulatory and reimbursement process. In Canada, an innovative 
programme called EXCITE, seeks to coordinate the process of evidence 
development for MDs in both the pre- and post-market phase (Tsoi et al, 2013) 
(9). Under this programme device manufacturers can ask for advice on the 
studies required to expedite the market approval and reimbursement of their 
product. A similar initiative, known as Shaping European Early Dialogues 
(SEEDS), has been recently launched in in Europe through an international 
project financed by the European Commission (www.earlydialogues.eu, 
Accessed on July 18th 2016). The aim of the SEED project was to conduct pilots 
on early dialogues between HTA agencies and developers of health products 
(pharmaceuticals and medical devices) whose products were the development 
stage. A total of 11 pilot early dialogues have been completed (8 on drugs and 3 
on medical devices). The SEED consortium is expected to release its 
recommendations for a permanent model for conducting early dialogues in 
Europe in late 2016.  
 
In 2012, the European Commission adopted a package of measures on 
innovation in health. The package consisted of a communication and two 
regulation proposals to revise existing legislation. Specifically, it contained 
proposals to improve the traceability of medical devices throughout the supply 
chain and updated risk classification rules, dividing medical devices into four 
different risk categories. The proposed revisions affected all kinds of medical 
devices including in vitro diagnostic medical devices, from home-use items like 
sticking plasters, pregnancy tests and contact lenses, to X-ray machines, 
pacemakers, breast implants, hip replacements and HIV blood tests.  
 
The aim of the revisions was to ensure a consistently high level of health and 
safety protection for EU citizens using these products, the free and fair trade of 
the products throughout the EU and to ensure that EU legislation is adapted to 
the significant technological and scientific progress in this sector over the last 20 
years. Revisions included extending the scope for legislation, better supervision 
of independent assessment bodies, clear rights for manufacturers/distributors 
and stronger requirements for medical evidence aimed at strengthening clinical 
evidence, not necessarily experimental trials, in the pre-market phase and in the 
post-marketing phase through a  ǲpost market clinical follow up plan and a ǳ (http://ec.europa.eu/growth/sectors/medical-
devices/regulatory-framework/revision_en; accessed on 23rd July 2016).  
 
The other main consideration in the pre-marketing phase concerns the level of Ǯ-ǯ. Independently of 
any concerns about efficacy and safety, it might be argued that, in order to 
incentivize manufacturers to conduct clinical studies, manufacturers should be 
granted some measure of data exclusivity, in order to reward them for investing 
in evidence generation. Sorenson and Drummond (2014) (10) argued that fast-
followers could be required to generate the same clinical evidence as for other 
devices already on the market, unless there is compelling evidence of their 
comparable manufacture. However, this could result in a waste of resources in 
conducting clinical studies that are not necessary, raising clinical development 
costs and denying the health care system the benefits that arise from the price 
competition that fast-follows generate. In addition, the larger companies with 
the resources to undertake higher quality clinical studies might use this 
requirement as a barrier to entry for smaller companies. 
 
 
Ǯ-equivalenceǯ 
 
Given the issues identified above, it is likely that some role for claiming ǮǯǤǡǮǯǤ ? ? ?ȋȌ
programme in the US suggests that some products granted equivalence were 
found to be not truly equivalent in the long run (Kesselheim and Rajan, 2014) 
(8). This suggests that under programmes such as 510(k), there should also be a 
provision for collecting follow-up clinical data in order to verify that the decision 
to grant substantial equivalence was correct. The same approach could also be 
followed in verifying whether product modifications lead to changes in the 
performance of MDs (Rome et al, 2014) (4) 
 
Strengthening the arrangements for post-market research 
 
Many of the comments above suggest that the most promising approach might 
be to strengthen the arrangements for post-market research. Not only would this 
avoid the costs and delays in patient access resulting from more stringent 
requirements for pre-market research, it would produce more evidence on the 
effectiveness of MDs in regular clinical practice. Many clinical registries for MDs 
already exist, but many are of inadequate quality, or are not useful for health 
technology assessment. One important, and generally agreed, improvement is 
the use of a unique device identifier, which is being phased in by the FDA and is 
also proposed in the EU. This will greatly facilitate the traceability of MDs and 
help monitor safety and effectiveness (FDA, 2016) (11). The recent European 
Union MedtecHTA Project made further recommendations concerning the design 
of registries to facilitate the assessment of comparative effectiveness. Ideally, 
registries should include more than one device, routinely collect information on 
possible confounding factors in order to facilitate the analysis of observational 
data, collect data on treatment patterns and resource use over time in order to 
monitor leaning effects and stratify patients by level of risk (Tarricone et al, 
2016) (12). 
 
In order to bring about these changes, jurisdictions need to develop a 
coordinated approach to the initiation, design and analysis of post-market 
research for MDs. Such initiatives have been undertaken in a number of ǡǮage with evidence deǯǡǮǯǡǮǯ
Kingdom. Typically, these schemes are initiated by the main payer for health care 
in the jurisdiction concerned, such as the government or social insurance system, 
although the arrangements for funding differ from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. 
The advantages and disadvantages of these initiatives, known collectively as Ǯ-based risk-ǯ
et 
al (2013) and Drummond (2015) (13,14). Rothery et al (2016) (15) discuss a 
number of the methodological issues in the design of these programmes and how 
the nature of the evidence collected and the nature of the requirement imposed 
on manufacturers may change as the evidence base on the device becomes more 
mature. 
 
Post-market schemes also present the opportunity to address some of the issues 
surrounding the incentives to conduct research, which are central to this paper. 
Rather than relying mainly on a single manufacturer, typically the first to market, 
to bear all the costs of undertaking the research and then granting others 
substantial equivalence at minimal cost, these schemes could facilitate cost-
sharing for research. If, on approval to market, each device was entered into the 
scheme after the conditions of substantial equivalence were met, the costs of 
further research could be shared among manufacturers, either in relation to the 
number of devices marketed, or in relation to their market share by value. 
Therefore, although the costs of research may still fall disproportionately on 
some manufacturers, this will be partly offset by the revenue that they earn.  
 
In addition, by entering each new device into a post-market scheme when it is 
granted market authorization, opportunities to gather evidence on the superior 
effectiveness of new devices compared with current standard of care, plus 
comparative effectiveness and safety among similar devices, are maximized and 
prior decisions to allow market entry of new devices based on the belief of 
substantial equivalence can be verified. 
 
There is no simple solution to rectifying the clinical evidence gap for medical 
devices. In particular, it would be too simplistic to treat them in the same way as 
pharmaceuticals. However, we believe that the proposals made in this paper 
offer a way forward. 
 
 
References 
 
1. Kramer DB, Xu S, Kesselheim AS. Regulation of medical devices in the United 
States and European Union. New England Journal of Medicine 2012; 366: 848-
855. 
 
2. Tarricone, R., Ferrè, F., Torbica, A., Drummond, M.F. (2014) Generating 
appropriate clinical data for value assessment of medical devices: what role does 
regulation pay? Expert Review of Pharmacoeconomics & Outcomes Research, 14:5, 
707-718.  
 
3. Fronsdal K, Pichler F, Mardhani-Bayne L, HenshallC, Rottingen JA, Morland B et 
al. Interaction initiatives between regulatory, health technologyassessment and 
coverage bodies, and industry. International Journal of Technology Assessment in 
Health Care 2012; 28: 374-381. 
 
4. Rome BN, Kramer DB, Kesselheim AS . FDA approval of cardiac implantable 
electronic devices via original and supplement premarket approval pathways. 
Journal of the American Medical Association 2014; 311: 385-391. 
 
5. Drummond, M.F., Griffin, A., Tarricone, R. (2009) Economic evaluation for 
devices and drugs. Same or different? Value in Health; 12(4) 402-404.  
 
6. Shuren J, Califf RM. (2016) Need for a national evaluation system for health 
technology. JAMA. Published Online: July 11, 2016. doi:10.1001/jama.2016.8708. 
 
7. US Food and Drug Administration (2016). Unsafe and ineffective devices 
approved in the EU that were not approved in the US. 
http://www.elsevierbi.com/~/media/Supporting%20Documents/The 
%20Gray%20Sheet/38/20/FDA_EU_Devices 
_Report.pdf. Accessed July 18, 2016. 
 
8. Kesselheim AS, Rajan PV. Regulating incremental innovation in medical 
devices. British Medical Journal 2014; 349: g5303 doi: 10.1136/bmj.g5303. 
 
9. Tsoi, B., ǯǡǤǡǡǤǡDrummond, M.F., Goeree, R. (2015) 
Harmonization of HTA-based reimbursement and regulatory approval activities: 
a qualitative. Journal of Population Therapeutics and Clinical Pharmacology, 22:1 
e78-e89.  
 
 
10. Sorenson, C., Drummond, M.F. (2014). Improving medical device regulation: 
the US and Europe in perspective. The Milbank Quarterly 92:1, 114-150. Doi: 
10.1111/1468-0009.12043.  
 
11, Food and Drug Administration. Rockville, MD, 2016. 
http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/UniqueDev
iceIdentification/ (Accessed 28 June, 2016) 
 
12. Tarricone R, Torbica A, Drummond, MF for the MedtecHTA Project Group 
(2016). Key recommendations from the MedtecHTA project. 
(www.medtechta.eu) 
 
13. Garrison LP, Towse A, Briggs A, de Pouvourville G, Greuger J Mohr PE, 
Severens JL, Siviero p, Sleeper M. Performance-based risk-sharing arrangements- 
Good practices for design, implementation and evaluation. Value in Health 2013; 
16:703-719. 
 
14. Drummond MF (2015) When do performance-based risk-sharing 
arrangements make sense? The European Journal of Health Economics, 16:6, 569-
571. doi: 10.1007/s10198-015-0683-z.   
 
15. Rothery C, Epstein D, Claxton K, Palmer S, Taylor R, Tarricone R, 
Sculpher M (2016) Characterising uncertainty in the assessment of medical 
devices and determining future research needs. (www.medtechta.eu). 
 
 
 
. 
